We analyze a psychologically-based model of voter turnout.
Introduction
After the 2000 US presidential election, CBS News / New York Times The question of why people vote in large elections is one that has occupied the minds of political scientists and economists alike. The initial idea of the "rational voter paradox" is in the celebrated work of Downs (1957) . If voting is costly and the only motivation for people to vote is to affect the outcome of the election, then they should never vote. The reason is that in large elections the probability of any single voter to affect the outcome of the election is infinitesimal.
However, observed turnout rates are quite high. Since the seminal 1 CBS News, November 13, 2000. Since it was a national poll, many of these voters reside in states where the election result was not in dispute. work of Downs, there has been a lot of attempts to explain this paradox. In our opinion, a satisfactory theoretical model has to be able to achieve three goals. First, it must explain significantly positive turnouts as equilibrium behavior in large elections. Second, it must account for other frequently observed empirical facts, for example, the positive correlation between turnout and the perceived competitiveness of elections. Lastly, it must be parsimonious so that the model can be enriched to study other interesting issues in large elections, for example, candidates' political positioning.
In this paper, we explain voter turnout by introducing voter regret. We study an election with two candidates and two corresponding groups of voters. Voters who failed to vote in an election suffer regret.
The magnitude of a voter's regret depends on whether or not his preferred candidate wins the election and on the margin of victory. The smaller the margin of victory, the higher is the regret suffered by any voter who did not vote. Moreover, for any fixed margin of victory, the regret of a voter on the losing side is higher than that on the winning side. 3 We call this assumption "winner regrets less." A potential voter votes if and only if his cost of voting is less than the expected regret he would suffer after the election if he did not vote.
Our model is a departure from the strictly "rational" model, where the incentive to vote depends solely on the voter's probability of affecting the outcome. In fact, since we have a continuum of voters in our model, the probability of any voter being pivotal is zero.
A common approach to explaining voter turnout is assuming that voters derive utility from participation in elections, either because of self-expression or sense of civic duty. We neither dispute the plausibility of such concerns nor rule them out from our model. However, 3 We want to de-emphasize the importance of a voter's (nonzero) regret from abstention while his favorite candidate wins. As we show in Example 2 in Section 5, such regret is not necessary for our equilibrium construction when voters are uncertain about the composition of preferences of the electorate.
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we enhance them with a psychological factor with an intuitive appeal.
Here, we give a short justification for our assumptions about voter regret, and we provide in Section 6 a detailed discussion of the concept of regret in our model. Voters feel regret if they do not vote because failure to vote is viewed negatively in a democratic society. It is conceivable that such negative (self-)perception is especially strong when the election is close or when a voter's favorite candidate lost the election. One possible interpretation is that ethical voters are empathetic towards those that belong to the same political group as theirs. Thus, an ethical voter thinks his action disappoints his peers or his favorite candidate if he does not vote. 4 Such regret becomes more poignant when the election result is close because the psychological effect of the letdown is stronger. This is also consistent with the anecdotal observation that voter apathy is contagious.
Assuming a decreasing density function of the distribution of the cost of voting, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive level of turnout. We account for the consistently observed empirical facts, namely, that turnout is lower for the winning side, that it is positively correlated with perceived closeness of the election, and that it is positively correlated with the importance of the election.
We also allow voters to be uncertain about the composition of the electorate's political preferences, and derive similar results.
In our model, a voter votes because he anticipates that he will experience regret if he does not. The voting equilibrium in our model is a margin of victory and turnout levels for the two groups that are consistent with each other. First, an anticipated margin of victory determines a cost threshold for either group, such that voters with voting cost below those thresholds vote in the election, and thereby determines the turnouts for the two groups. Conversely, each pair of 4 An ethical voter may also feel regret about not voting because this contributes to making himself an apathetic person. This is reminiscent of arguments made by Frank (1988) (Ch. 11, "Human Decency.").
4 turnout levels determines a resulting margin of victory. Consistency requires the anticipated margin of victory and the resulting margin of victory to be the same. The first condition requires that turnouts decrease as the margin of victory increases, since regret is inversely related to margin of victory. On the other hand, the second condition causes margin of victory to increase as turnouts increase, given our "winner regret less" assumption and the decreasing pdf of the cost distribution. Therefore, there is a unique voting equilibrium.
Let us consider the intuition of the comparative statics results.
First, lower turnout for the winning side is simply implied by the fact the winning voters regret less about not voting. Second, as the election is perceived to be closer, fixing turnout levels, the anticipated winning margin is going to be smaller. By our "winner regrets less" assumption and the decreasing pdf of the cost distribution function, an increase in turnout would cause the winning margin to increase. Thus, the equilibrium turnout must increase to restore consistency. Finally, as the election becomes more important, given the same winning margin, both turnouts will increase, causing the equilibrium turnout to increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model of voting with regrets. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and analyzes how voter turnout varies with various factors. Section 5 introduces an example in which there is uncertainty about the voter population.
Section 6 discusses the concept of regret in our model and its relation to the existing literature. Section 7 concludes and discusses possible extensions.
Related Literature
In this section, we discuss the relationship of our paper to the literature on voter turnout. In Section 6, we discuss the concept of regret that we use in our model.
Since the work of Downs, there has been a large literature that tries to explain voter turn-out in large elections. Most of the early works starting with Tullock (1968) were decision theoretic models.
An important and controversial paper in this genre is by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974 Our model is closer in spirits to that of Riker and Ordeshook (1968) . They analyze a model of voter participation in which agents receive a duty payoff D > 0 when they vote for their preferred candidate. In our model, one can reinterpret regret as a payoff (negative)
5 For a detailed description of this criterion, see Luce and Raiffa (1957) , pp.
280-282.
6 For a sample of such criticisms, see Beck (1975) , Mayer and Good (1975), and Tullock (1975) .
6 that the agents receive for not voting for their preferred candidate.
However, in their model the payoff D is independent of the election outcome, which is fitting to the duty payoff interpretation. In our model, by contrast, for any fixed level of the margin of victory, the regret that a voter on the losing side incurs is higher than that incurred by one on the winning side. Moreover, regret is a decreasing function of the margin of victory. This, together with assumptions on the distribution of voting cost, allows our model to deliver comparative statics that is different from that of Riker and Ordeshook (1968) .
For example, in Riker and Ordeshook's model, turnout level is fixed and independent of the relative size of the minority. By contrast, our model predicts that turnout will be higher among the minority than among the majority and yet the majority's preferred candidate wins.
Moreover, turnout progressively diminishes as the size of the minority goes down. In addition, in our model, turnout increases as the size of the minority approaches the size of the majority and as the importance of election increases. These are well in line with empirical evidence. Thus, our paper can be put in the broad category of research that uses "ethical-voter" models. The survey on political economy by Merlo (2006) contains a concise discussion of various voter turnout models.
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The first game-theoretical papers on voter turnout use the socalled pivotal-voter model. Ledyard (1982) is the first to analyze the problem of voting behavior in large elections using game theoretic models. The model also allows endogenous party-positions. The paper does not however characterize turnout levels though there are some examples. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) study a simplified version of the Ledyard model with complete information. They show that in the vot-8 See also Aldrich (1993 ), Feddersen (2004 and Dhillon and Peralta (2002) . shown by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) , with incomplete information regarding the voting costs, there is essentially a unique low turnout equilibrium for large electorates. Myerson (1998) adds another source of uncertainty in elections by considering games with population uncertainty. In a setting where population uncertainty is modelled as a Poisson process, it is shown that the low turn-out equilibrium is the unique prediction.
According to the classification proposed by Merlo (2006) , 9 in addition to the pivotal-voter and ethical-voter models, there is a third category: uncertain-voter model, where turnout is related to voters uncertainty about who is the best candidate. In all such models (e.g., those of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) , Matsusaka (1995) , Degan (2006) and Degan and Merlo (2007) ), the possibility of voting for the wrong candidate engenders a cost and therefore uncertain voters may prefer to abstain. While in Feddersen and Pesendorfer's (1996) model such a cost depends on pivotal considerations, in the models of Degan (2006) and Degan and Merlo (2007) , as in ours, it is a psychological cost derived from doing the wrong thing, not because of the effect a voter's decision has on the outcome. In Matsusaka's (1995) There are also papers by Conley, Toossi, and Wooders (2001) and Sieg and Schulz (1995) , who use evolutionary models and investigate conditions under which high turnout survives. Their research may also be interpreted as providing explanation to why voters may have ethical preferences.
We know of two other papers that assume voters' utility endogenously depends on the election outcome. Llavador (2006) the pivotal-voter model with small elections, and find that it is outperformed by an expressive voting model. Degan and Merlo (2007) structurally estimate a model of turnout and voting in multiple elections, using data from the US presidential and congressional elections. Let δ and 0 be respectively the utility a voter gets when his favorite candidate gets elected and when the opposing candidate gets elected, due to the different policies they will implement. So, δ can be interpreted as the importance of the election.
Let c be the cost of voting, a random variable that are distributed on [0, +∞) according to the same distribution function F and density function f for both A-and B-voters. The parameters α, δ, and F are common knowledge among voters.
A significant part of the cost of voting is the opportunity cost.
The opportunity cost of voting for a retiree is lower than that for an active worker. The opportunity cost of voting for a worker with a flexible schedule is lower than that for a worker with a rigid one.
A I−voter's expected "material" payoff from voting for candidate
as the probability of his vote affecting the election outcome is zero,
given that we have a continuum of voters.
In addition to his material payoff, a voter incurs regret when the election is close and he fails to vote or votes for the opposing candidate. The level of regret is determined by the closeness of the election. The closer the election, the higher the regret.In addition, his regret from not voting is larger when his favorite candidate loses by a certain margin than when the candidate wins by the same margin.
Since a voter experiences regret if he votes for the wrong candidate, voting for the opposing candidate is dominated by voting for one's favorite candidate. Therefore, we will only consider the case where voters vote for their favorite candidate if they vote at all.
We define candidate I's margin of victory to be equal to the difference between the number of voters voting for candidate I and the number of those voting for his opponent, −I. Let τ A and τ B be the turnouts for each type of voters. Thus, candidate A's margin of victory is
We assume the voter's regret takes the form
where m is the margin of victory (or, margin of loss if m < 0) for the voter's favorite candidate. Hereafter, we will refer to the function R as the absolute regret function, and r as the relative regret function, or simply the regret function. Note that absolute regret is simply relative regret scaled up by δ, which measures the importance of the election.
A voter's expected payoff from not voting is
The function r is nonnegative, continuously differentiable except possibly at m = 0, strictly increasing for m < 0, and strictly decreasing for m > 0.
For clarity of exposition, we separate the regret function into two parts: r − : R − → R + and r + : R + → R + . They are defined by
We assume that r has the following property.
Assumption 1. (Winner regrets less.)
The regret function r satisfies:
The first part of the assumption says that when an abstaining voter's favorite candidate loses by an arbitrarily small margin, his regret is higher than that if his favorite candidate wins by an arbitrarily small margin. The second part can be interpreted as: "when the margin of victory increases by a small amount, the decrease in regret for an abstaining voter on the winner's side is more than that if he is on the loser's side." In other words, "a winner gets complacent more easily." These two parts imply
for all m > 0, or "winner regrets less."
Equilibrium
We look for equilibria of the model defined as follows. c. the candidate with a majority of the votes wins.
As we concluded in the previous section, the pivotal probability for any single voter is zero. Therefore, a voter chooses to vote if
and not to vote if the inequality goes the other direction. If the two alternatives give him the same utility, he can choose either option.
We focus on the case α > 1/2. That is, a majority of voters prefer candidate A to B. As we will demonstrate below, this will preclude the possibility of a tie in the election.
First, observe that if an I−voter (I = A, B) of cost c finds it optimal to vote, then another I−voter of cost c < c must also find it optimal to vote. Therefore, the equilibrium can be characterized by two cutoff cost values for each group of voters, c A and c B . Thus, the equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
The following lemma states that the candidate with a higher proportion of supporters, A, wins the election.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, voters on the winner's side must have a lower turnout. Hence, A must win the election in equilibrium.
Proof. The first statement is a direct consequence of Assumption 1. A voter on the winner's side has lower regret. Therefore, the cutoff cost value for the winner's side must be lower, which implies lower turnout since both types have the same cost distribution, F .
The second statement is implied by the first. Since α > 1 2
, in order for B to win, B-voters must have a higher turnout than Avoters, which contradicts the first statement.
Note that the above discussion is conditional on the existence of an equilibrium, to which we turn now. As we know A wins the election in equilibrium, let m be the winning margin by A. From equations (4) and (5), we have
A triple (τ A , τ B , m) constitutes a voting equilibrium outcome if and only if it is a solution to equations (6), (7), and (8). Together, they
An m that satisfies the above equation uniquely determines a voting equilibrium outcome.
Let us use µ(·) to denote the function defined by the right hand side of (9).
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The right hand side of Equation (9) We make the following assumption to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.
Intuitively, the assumption requires that when the winning margin is arbitrarily close to zero, the voters on the majority side who prefer voting to abstention will outnumber such voters on the minority side. That is, the majority voters will not be so complacent as to make the election outcome to go the other way. Mathematically, taking α and F as fixed, this assumption requires that the discontinuity of r at 0 cannot be too severe. Proof. We show this by applying the intermediate value theorem to (9).
First, by our assumptions, both sides of (9) are continuous functions of m.
Second, when m = 0, the right hand side of (9), µ(m), is positive by Assumption 2. Therefore, m < µ(m) at m = 0.
where the first inequality is implied by Assumption 1 and the third inequality by α > 1 2
. Therefore, m > µ(m) at m = α.
Using the Intermediate Value Theorem, we conclude there exists
The uniqueness of equilibrium is not guaranteed with the given set of assumptions. The following is a sufficient condition.
Assumption 3. The density function of cost distribution, f , is nonincreasing.
A rough interpretation of the assumption is that voters with low costs are more populous than those with high costs.
Theorem 2. Given Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Consider equation (9). It suffices to show its right hand side,
To see this, observe that
which we conclude to be negative by Assumptions 1 and 3 and α > 1 2 .
Thus, the solution to (9) is unique, which implies uniqueness of equilibrium.
To understand the argument for uniqueness, note that in equilibrium candidate A wins the election and that the winning margin m uniquely determines the equilibrium. Let us consider an alternative equilibrium with a lower winning margin for A. Thus, the turnouts of A-voters and B-voters should both increase. However, since the corresponding cutoff cost level for B−voters is higher than that for A−voters (Assumption 1) and the density of high-cost voters is lower (Assumption 3), since the cutoff level for B−voters increases at a slower rate than that for A−voters (Assumption 1), and since B−voters are less populous, this will cause A's winning margin to go up, contradicting our stipulation that the winning margin goes down.
We can derive a similar contradiction if we try to find an equilibrium with a higher winning margin. Thus, there is only winning margin that ensures the resulting turnouts produce exactly the same winning Proof. This is simply a consequence of the equilibrium equations, and the properties of the regret function, r.
Note that the turnouts in the above lemma is the within-group turnout, not the total turnout of all voters. The lemma states that if a change in parameter values causes the turnout in A-voters (or B-voters) to rise, it must also cause the winning margin to drop.
We now turn to comparative statics of turnouts with respect to various aspects of the election. First, turnouts are inversely related to the dominance of the majority, or positively related to the competitiveness of the election.
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Theorem 3. Turnouts for A-and B-voters, τ A and τ B , are decreasing in α. Furthermore, the total turnout, τ = ατ A + (1 − α)τ B , is also decreasing in α.
Proof. We show that the equilibrium turnout, m, increases as α increases. Then, by Lemma 2, both τ A and τ B are decreasing in α.
As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 2, the right hand side of (9), µ(·), is strictly decreasing in m. Note also the left hand side of (9) does not depend on α. In addition,
A direct application of the implicit function theorem gives us the desired conclusion. In fact,
where the denominator is negative and the numerator positive. The negative sign in front of the expression implies the whole expression is positive.
12 One need use caution in interpreting this result. As Lemma 2 states, the equilibrium turnout is inversely related to the equilibrium winning margin, or the realized lopsidedness of the election. However, it is not immediately clear that the ex ante lopsidedness of the election will translate into realized lopsidedness.
Theorem 3 shows that such translation does occur. Thus, it is appropriate to interpret the theorem as saying turnouts increase with the perceived lopsidedness of the election. See also Corollary 6.3 in Section 5.
We now turn to how the total turnout, τ = ατ A +(1−α)τ B , varies with α. We have
First, observe τ A < τ B in equilibrium by Lemma 1. Second, both dτ A /dα and dτ B /dα are negative. Thus, we may conclude
This theorem states that within-group turnouts must decrease as the winning side becomes more dominant, or the level of disagreement among all voters becomes lower. As the dominance of majority increases, the resulting winning margin at a given level of turnout for A−voters is higher. Thus, the equilibrium turnout has to decrease to restore the consistency between turnout and winning margin. In the meantime, the total turnout also decreases, as the turnouts for both groups are lower and more weight is put on the low-turnout group, the A−voters.
Our next result concerns the relationship between turnouts and the importance of the election.
Theorem 4. Turnouts for A-and B-voters, τ A and τ B , are increasing in the importance of the election, δ. In addition, the total turnout, τ , is also increasing in δ.
Proof. We discuss τ A only, as the argument for τ B is similar. From (6), we have
Consider again Equation (9). Its left hand side does not depend on δ.
But derivative of the right hand side with respect to δ can be written
Applying the implicit function theorem to (9), we have
Using (10), we have 1. The margin of victory under F is higher than that under G.
The distribution function F is a rightward shift of G, that is,
for all some ε > 0 and all c in the support of F .
Proof.
1. This is a direct implication of the property that the regret function is inversely related to the margin of victory and the assumption that F first order stochastically dominates G. First, we argue that m * < m . By assumption, for all m, . But, the right hand side of the inequality is equal to αF (δr(m)) − (1 − α)F (δr(−m)). This 22 means that compared to G, F shifts µ downwards in Figure 1 .
Denote the equilibrium margins of victory for candidate A under
As a result, the equilibrium winning margin must be lower under
Second, we argue that τ * A < τ A and τ *
Thus, either δr(m
by the second part of Assumption 1. Thus,
Since r(−m ) > r(m ), α > 1/2, and G satisfies Assumption 3, we have
or m * > m , contradicting our conclusion above. Thus, τ * J < τ J for J = A, B.
We now present an example that illustrates the voting equilibrium in our model. Example 1. Suppose the regret function takes the following form:
otherwise.
In addition, assume that voting cost is uniformly distributed on [0, C]
with C ≥ δ (this is to ensure no corner solutions exist in which all B-voters vote). Substituting these into the equilibrium equations, we
The equilibrium margin of victory is decreasing in C and increasing in α. Both turnouts increase with δ, and increase as α approaches 
Uncertainty about the Electorate's Political Preferences
In the previous sections, we have introduced an essentially deterministic model. In equilibrium, a voter correctly anticipates the outcome of the election and the exact value of his regret if he fails to vote. We believe the model captures the idea that voter participation is driven by anticipated regret from not voting. In reality, of course, voters are uncertain about the election outcome. To encompass this in our model, we may allow α to be uncertain to each voter, while maintaining our assumptions about the regret function.
To be specific, let G be the distribution of α and g its corresponding density function. , 1].
Note that this implies that G second order stochastically dominates the uniform distribution (G can be the uniform distribution itself). We may write the equilibrium equations as
Our next theorem demonstrates that a unique positive-turnout equilibrium exists in the voting game with uncertainty about α.
Theorem 6. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Then, in the voting game with uncertainty, there exists a unique equilibrium with positive turnout, in which τ A = τ b = τ * , where τ * satisfies
Proof. First, we show that in equilibrium, τ A = τ B . Suppose instead
With a change of variables in the equilibrium characterization above, we have
The first term on the right hand side is negative by our "winner regrets less" assumption (Assumption 1). The second term can be rewritten
By Assumption 4 and the assumption τ A > τ B , we have g(
. Therefore, the second term is also 25 negative by Assumption 1. Hence c A < c B , which contradicts our
Now, we demonstrate that a unique equilibrium exists. Let τ denote the turnout level for both groups. The equilibrium condition becomes (11). The left hand side is strictly increasing and the right hand side strictly decreasing in τ . Furthermore, when τ = 0, F −1 (τ ) = 0, while the right hand side is strictly positive; when τ → 1, F −1 (τ ) approaches ∞ if the voting cost c has an unbounded support, 13 while the right hand remains bounded. Therefore, there exists a unique τ * that satisfies the equilibrium condition.
The following two corollaries consider how voting cost and the importance of the election affect turnout. The higher the voting cost, the lower the turnout; the more important the election is, the higher the turnout. The former is different from our result in the deterministic case, mainly because here the two groups are ex ante symmetric while it is not the case in the deterministic case. The latter is similar to that in the deterministic case.
Corollary 6.1. LetF and F be two distributions of voting cost, c, such thatF first order stochastically dominates F . Then, the equilibrium voter turnout is lower underF than that under F .
Corollary 6.2. The equilibrium voter turnout is increasing in δ, the importance of the election.
The proofs are straightforward and omitted here. They use similar arguments to those in the proof of Corollary 6.3.
Our next result concerns how voter turnouts are affected by voters' uncertainty about α.
Corollary 6.3. Let G andG be two distributions of α that satisfy Assumption 4 and letG second order stochastically dominate G. Then, the equilibrium voter turnout underG is higher than that under G.
Proof. Note that the equilibrium turnout is the τ at which the left hand and right hand sides of (11) intersect. Also, the left hand side is increasing while the right hand side is decreasing in τ . Thus, it suffices to show that underG, the right hand side of (11) is shifted up from that under G. Using integration by parts, we have
The first term is equal to zero. The second term can be rewritten
Using Assumption 4 and the assumption thatG seconde order stochastically dominates G, we havẽ
Combining these with the assumption that r (m) is positive for m < 0 and negative for m > 0, we conclude
Hence, the equilibrium turnout underG is higher than that under
G.
The above theorem shows that if the election is anticipated to be close, then voter turnout is higher, again echoing our result in the deterministic case. The reason is that as elections become close, a voter is more likely to experience a high regret if he does not vote. . In addition, we assume that it is common knowledge that α is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Thus,
Again, we can show that in equilibrium τ A = τ B by deriving a contradiction from supposing they are not equal. Solving the equations 14 A similar result is obtained by Taylor and Yildirim (2005) . They show that when voters are strategic, giving them more information about the composition of the voting population increases turnout. But, it also increases the possibility that the election turns out in favor of the minority candidate.
gives us
Clearly, the turnout is increasing in the importance of the election δ.
In addition, it is decreasing in the upper bound of the cost, C, which implies that in this case higher voting cost causes lower turnout.
The Concept of Regret
In this section, we elaborate on the concept of regret used in our model, and compare our use with its use in the literature.
Regret is a widely observed psychological phenomenon. According to Landman (1993) It is commonly known that regret tends to have an unpleasant emotional effect on an individual's mind. Therefore, it is natural to expect that while making decisions, people take the anticipated regret into account, at least, in situations where they are frequently involved.
Some economic and decision theorists have emphasized the role of anticipated regret in decision making. Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) propose decision regret as explanations of paradoxical 29 behavior that cannot be accommodated by expected utility theory.
The concept of regret in these models is very narrowly defined. For example, Bell (1982) defines it as "the difference in value between the actual assets received and the highest level of assets produced by other alternatives."As a result, the application of their theory to economic models is quite limited.
In psychological research, by contrast, regret has increasingly become recognized as an important factor in decision making. 15 One of the first such studies is by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) . Subsequent In our model, we introduce regret as an enhancement of Riker and Ordeshook's civic-duty model. We believe that the "warm glow" utility received by a voter as a result of fulfilling his civic duty should be independent of the election outcome. In addition to this type of utility, we believe voters' psychological involvement in the success or failure of their favorite candidates or alternatives is a significant factor 16 We make the assumption that an abstaining voter's regret on the winning side is less than that on the losing side. In addition, such regret increases as the election result becomes close. We believe these assumptions are plausible and intuitively appealing. Though empirical evidence that supports them is not widely available, they can be readily tested with surveys of potential voters. As we discuss below, the experimental study conducted by Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) does provide evidence in support of the existence of voter regret.
In the following discussion, we want to address the concern that voters in our model experience regret even though they know their votes do not affect the outcome. It is our contention that people frequently regret their decisions because they deem them ethically and morally questionable and not because outcomes would have been different if they had acted differently. First, this fits into the broad definition by Landman (1993) should vote even if their preferred candidate is certain to lose (Brody (1978) ).
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each of them would not have altered the outcome of the election.
17
Third, Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) provide some further evidence with an experiment in a real election. They conducted a study with the Dutch national elections in which they asked voters to express their regret for their various actions (voting, abstention, voting for a particular party, etc.). Again, in such elections, each individual's vote does not affect the outcome of the elections. Nevertheless, their results showed that voters regretted their intention-action inconsistencies, like intending to vote but failing to do so, or intending to vote for x but voting for y instead. Though intention-action inconsistencies were their focus, their results also showed that voters who did not vote experience higher regret than those who did: those who intended to vote but failed to do so experienced the strongest regret among all groups; those who intended not to vote and did not vote (therefore does not commit intention-action inconsistency) nevertheless experienced higher regret than those who intended to vote for x and voted for x in the election (see Table 1 , p. 22 of their paper).
Concluding Remarks and Further Research
In this paper, we have introduced a two-candidate model of electoral competition in which potential voters are ethical in that they experience regret after the election if they did not vote. The regret is inversely related to the margin of victory. Furthermore, voters on the winning side experience less regret than those on the losing side. We show that there is a unique equilibrium with strictly positive turnout.
Furthermore, voter turnout is positively related to the importance of the election, and negatively related to the perceived lopsidedness of the competition. These are true both when voters are sure about the proportion of voters that favor each candidate and when they are not.
We view our current research as laying a tractable framework in which many interesting issues can be studied. In our model, the positions of candidates and voters are exogenously given, so are the proportions of voters who would vote for either candidate. Therefore, we see many directions in which this model can be extended. First, candidates need not have a predetermined position. They want to position themselves to appeal to a larger proportion of potential voters. Also, the potential voter population need not be fixed. Election campaigns dissipate information to more voters, and much effort is devoted to attracting one's own voters or discouraging opponents'. 
